Voting is seen as driven by emotions and affected by political symbols, and not by "sterile," rational considerations Iversen b, In this vacuous situation, leadership factors can be expected to make up for some of the unexplained variations in the traditional models. Theoretical innovation is needed, however, since models based on social background, party identification and issues all fail to disentangle the intimate relationship. Recently, however, attempts have been made to identify and systematize the conditions that structure the relationship between leader images and party support.
With the improvement and expansion of communication channels, a "new political technology" including polling, media appearances, PR, etc. That "TV makes you or breaks you" is only a slight exaggeration nowadays, 3 and the politicians are fully aware of this. This process is perhaps best captured by the notion of political marketing ibid. Heath et al.
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In contrast to the traditional orthodoxy that childhood socialization influences a person's political party identification and ultimately determines the vote choice, voting is compared with the purchase of consumer goods. Akin to the motivation behind consumer behavior, the way the political product is advertised and wrapped is seen to affect voting more than the inner qualities of the product itself.
To some extent therefore, political marketing requires the politicians not only to sell ideas but to sell themselves as well Newman , Indeed, it is only from this perspective we can fathom the bizarre media events during elections campaigns, where "Mrs Thatcher puts on Wellington boots and tramps around the farm; Mr Kinnock goes to the bakery and wears a starched white hat" Butler , 72 , and why Norwegian party leaders "meet the very old, the newborn, fish in fishing-wells and wear work clothes that they never before have worn.
And the relationship between the messenger and the message is an intimate one. Thus, voters are not only expected to sanction the message which can be traced back to the party manifesto but the messenger as well. Context affects all political parties, but not all of the time in all places.
Esaiasson , identifies some of these factors. First, there is the constitutional condition. Leadership effects are expected to be stronger in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, simply because in the former system there is a stronger focus on the candidate. Second, historical factors come to play where leader effects should be weaker for parties molded by a history of stable and continuous democracy than for parties born in new democracies.
Third, in systems where parties are firmly embedded in the cleavage structure, leader effects are expected to be more feeble than in systems that allow vote maximizing party behavior independent of for example class and religion. Fourth, the electoral system itself may be considered a contextual factor. Majority systems generally focus more on the local candidate than systems with proportional representation.
On the other hand, the national party leader should attract more attention in centralized systems. A fifth condition pertains to the prevailing leadership culture. The stronger the infusion of authoritarian values, the more important leadership effects are expected to be. Based on these criteria alone, it is difficult to make clear predictions as to the strength of Norwegian leadership effects. On the one hand, Norway has a parliamentary system based on proportional representation and a stable party system. Both factors should weaken leadership effects.
On the other hand, the political system is centralized, small and transparent, and the cleavage structure has started to fade here as elsewhere. The egalitarian aspect of the Norwegian social democratic culture should prevent effects caused by blind leader loyalty. However, in recent years, while Brundtland was still prime minister, the media and the voters alike started treating her with remarkable subservience.
This phenomenon, which will be discussed further below, suggests that the Norwegian culture contains a dose of hierarchical elements as well. The relationship between leader images and party support is stronger for.
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Since the policies of the opposition are necessarily hypothetical and government policies are real, opposition leaders might play a more important role as advertisers than the prime minister. On the other hand, the latter has to defend and explain government policies on a day to day basis, something that evidently attracts media attention. Note also that the visibility of the opposition leader should, ceteris paribus, be a negative function of the number of parties in the political system: As the number of opposition leaders increases, so does the probability of being ignored by the media.
In addition to the government-opposition dichotomy, there is a related distinction between small and large parties. Since such parties are both invisible and irrelevant, leadership effects are held to be insignificant. This description is more apt for Britain than it is for Norway, though. A Norwegian non-socialist government cannot be established without participation by, or at least the explicit support from, the small centrist parties.
Also, in Norway the size of the parties is usually negatively related to the charisma of their leaders. These are parties very closely tied to, and often founded by, the party leader. In Norway, the Progress Party fits this definition rather well. This brings us to a third dichotomy between old and new parties. Within a context of "frozen cleavages," a charismatic party leader is required to make up for the initial electoral handicap. Old parties have core voters, new parties do not.
Whereas established parties can choose leaders based on tenure and party loyalty, personal charisma and voter appeal are the tools new parties must use to pass the electoral threshold. If leaders influence party support, then the next question is how they influence it. Despite the large menu of leader qualities to choose from. These are qualities politicians themselves like to highlight. For example, the West German electoral campaign featured billboards of CDU leader Kohl saying that "Dieser Kanzler shafft Vertrauen" "this chancellor inspires confidence". Leadership qualities can be tied to Weber's , 5 traditional authority, or habitual compliance, and charismatic authority due to the extraordinary personal qualities of the leader.
As for tradition, a "longitudinal incumbency" factor has been identified Norris et al. The point is simply that the longer politicians remain active in politics, the larger their crowd of loyal followers will be. When it comes to charisma, an analysis inspired by the directional theory of voting shows that politicians who present clear and intense policy alternatives tend to attract more votes than those who are afraid to leave "the empty center" Iversen b, It appears, then, that a popular leader is one who leads, rather than one who is being led.
The Storting election was very much affected by the controversial question of Norwegian membership in the European Union, a question decided by referendum the following year. The issue made some leaders more visible than others. Her party finished as the undisputed winner of the election with an increase from 6.
The Center Party even replaced the Conservatives as the largest opposition party in parliament. As Figure 1 shows, Lahnstein was a popular leader. Whether this popularity is causally related to the success of her party will be explored further in the empirical analysis below. By far the most popular leader in the election was Gro Harlem Brundtland.
However, voters undoubtedly perceived the leadership of the Labor Party, and indeed of the country as a whole, to lie firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister. Brundtland was the first woman prime minister in the Nordic countries, and the youngest prime minister ever to be appointed in the history of Norwegian parliamentarism.
Except for Einar Gerhardsen, she is the longest serving prime minister in the post-war period. Brundtland is known for attempts to rise above everyday politics Jenssen , 91 , and at times her role seems more congruent with that of a president. She has been criticized by the media and the opposition alike for her silence on issues concerning actual and unpopular government policies, while being very accommodating. Party and Leader Sympathy in Norway. The Storting Election.
The "Brundtland factor" was frequently mentioned in editorial columns. The day after the election, one newspaper wrote: "There can be little doubt that Gro Harlem Brundtland's strong position as prime minister has been the greatest advantage for her party. Only three months before the election, the opinion polls showed that support for the Labor Party was at a dismal 27 percent of the votes Valen , From June to September, the support increased by 10 percentage points. He declared that a poor election result would mean the replacement of the Labor government, probably by a Conservative minority government.
The question of governance boiled down to a choice between Kaci Kullman Five from the Conservatives and Gro Harlem Brundtland as the future prime minister. Apart from the fact that there was no parliamentary support for a Conservative government, Brundtland was simply much more popular than Five. Figure 1 shows that Brundtland received an average score of As previously mentioned, directional theory identifies intense preferences, tenure and charisma as prerequisites for high leader approval.
Apparently, the leader of the Progress Party, Carl I. Hagen, possesses all three qualities. Since , he has remained in charge of a party that, at least by Norwegian standards, has adopted an extreme right-wing orientation. Nonetheless, Figure 1 suggests that Hagen, though more popular than his party, is less popular than the other leaders. This does not necessarily mean that Hagen is an electoral liability. A low score may reflect high intensity, in the sense that the respondents who approve of Hagen give him disproportionally high scores, while those who disapprove give him disproportionally low scores.
Since the latter group is larger than the former, the average score will automatically be low. The inverse should also apply. A high leader score does not in itself increase the probability of electoral success. As for the latter, despite a drop from his sympathy level in the previous election, Solheim was more popular with the average voter than the leaders of the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the Progress Party. Yet, the Socialist Party only received 7. Not all leaders from small parties are popular.
The lack of leadership charisma has been a persistent problem for the Liberal Party, and, apart from Hagen of the Progressive Party, its leaders have received the lowest sympathy scores in all three Storting elections since The Liberal Party only got 3. Despite these differences in party and leader sympathy levels, there are common global effects that should tie all the parties and their leaders closely together.
In fact, the probability of leadership effects for any of the parties should be higher in the Storting election than in any previous election. Volatility was record high Aardal , , and party popularity changed dramatically during the campaign Valen , This was also the election when the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation lost its monopoly on campaign coverage. As commercial television channels joined the competition, viewers were exposed to political debates and presentations to an extent that was historically unprecedented Aardal , In this media-driven campaign, the party leaders were at the center of attention.
However, such control is only one aspect of model specification. Just as omitted variables yield biased and inconsistent results, so does misspecification of causal relationships Johnston , It is common knowledge that the higher the sympathy for a party, the higher the sympathy for its leader see e. This positive correlation can have as many as six different sources.
First, a general observation is that "the relationship between leaders and followers is always double-sided and interdependent" Putnam , A reciprocal relationship between leader approval and party support may therefore have to be specified. The second alternative, which prevails in the literature see e. Bean and Mughan ; Bean ; Stewart and Clarke , focuses on what leaders do for their parties rather than on what parties do for their leaders. Leader approval is seen as a cause of party support. The third alternative, on the other hand, is that a popular party can make up for lack of leadership charisma, and an unpopular party can stifle the appeal of its leader.
In this perspective, party support causes leader approval, and not the other way around. Fourth, there might be an indirect relationship between leader images and party support. This possibility is easily overlooked. As an example, based on three key variables, i. As long as the voters vote for a party and not for a leader, this is hardly surprising. Party sympathy is a direct and immediate cause of vote choice the more you like the party, the higher the probability that you vote for it , but it is also part of the vote choice the party you like is the party you vote for.
Whereas party sympathy and vote choice to some extent are different aspects of the same phenomenon, the distinction between leader sympathy and vote choice is more clear-cut. However, we would expect indirect effects by which leader sympathy affects party sympathy that in turn affects vote choice. In other words, the positive correlation between party sympathy and vote choice is partly a result of a positive correlation between leader and party sympathy. This point is pursued further in the empirical analysis below.
The fifth alternative is that voters fail to distinguish between the party and its leader. If you like the party, you tend to like the leader as well, and vice versa. The sixth alternative is the occurrence of a spurious relationship Hudson From the economic voting literature. A prolonged period in office usually wears out the popularity of both. There is also the more subtle argument that in times of economic depression, the government selects unattractive candidates, since it expects to lose the coming election anyway see Lewis-Beck , If this argument is valid which it probably is not , unpopular politicians in an unpopular government are both the result of a poor economy.
Since the relationship between leader images and party support cannot be decided upon a priori, model specification in general, and causality specification in particular, has to be determined on empirical grounds. In Norway, no regular time series data for leader popularity is available, and the data menu is restricted to two-wave panel and cross-sectional survey data. As a first step in the empirical analysis, a panel model is combined with the notion of Granger causality.
Since causes tend to appear before effects, a correlation between party sympathy in one election and leader sympathy in the previous election, or alternatively, between leader sympathy in one election and party sympathy in the previous election, should provide some information about the underlying causative process. The test is based on two equations.
In the first equation, party sympathy is regressed on lagged party sympathy and lagged leader sympathy. In the second equation, leader sympathy is regressed on lagged leader sympathy and lagged party sympathy. The technical details of this approach are relegated to Appendix 1. A study of the relationship between leader images and party support should distinguish between short-term and long-term effects.
For example, a time series analysis of monthly opinion poll data could reveal whether a good performance by a leader in a televised debate boosts party support in the subsequent months. However, according to Brown , , leader charisma has to mature over a long period, and a change of impact during a short election campaign is not probable. Therefore, a popular leader in one election may pave the way for a successful party only in the next election Esaiasson , A panel analysis, where the interval is defined by the period between one election and the next, captures such long-term effects.
Still, in a turbulent political climate, a popular leader in one election could easily be an unpopular leader in the next election.
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Therefore, a contemporaneous model, which ipso facto comprises both long-term and short-term effects, is also included in the empirical analysis. The above discussion suggests that if the data are cross sectional, a single equation model for the relationship between leader images and party support would be inappropriate. As long as the relationship is positive, the bias will also be positive and the estimated leadership effect inflated.
Due to this reciprocity, a nonrecursive model is needed, and in standard econometrics, 2SLS Two Stage Least Squares is commonly preferred. In our particular model, we have to find exogenous variables that affect leader approval directly but party support only indirectly, and vice versa. Since the identification process is tedious, the selection of variables is discussed in Appendix 2. At this point, suffice it to say that to control for the salience of the EU membership issue, three over-identified equations were used to capture voter behavior in the Storting election.
The nonrecursive causal model is specified as follows with intercepts omitted :. Their faltering electoral performance, therefore, may be partly attributed to a failure to compete successfully on new policy dimensions. At the same time, the close relationship between the decline in voter turnout and the electoral performance of the established parties indicates that organizational change—and in particular the scaling back of the grassroots organizations of mass parties—has also had a critical role to play.
Finally, and of considerable interest, is the finding that the increase in electoral volatility has not affected all parties proportionately, but rather has had a particularly negative impact on traditional parties.
A Study of the 1984 European Elections
Fluctuations in the Pedersen Index [Pedersen t —Pedersen t-1 ]. How should we interpret these results? On the one hand, we might expect to observe increased electoral volatility as a side effect of electoral realignment. That is, if party systems are currently undergoing a period of adjustment in response to socioeconomic changes, then we should see a short period of increased volatility p. On the other hand, if increased electoral volatility is in fact a symptom of more fundamental changes in party organizations, and in the nature of the voter—party relationship, then there is no reason to expect a reduction in volatility over time.
Adjudicating between these two forces is a challenging task for future research, and lies beyond the scope of this essay. The correlation between the contemporaneous and lagged values is only 0. The standard deviation for Pedersen t — Pedersen t —1 is much larger 8. Importantly, there is no indication of electoral stabilization despite the increasing number of new political parties described in Figure Based on the limited data available here, what we seem to be observing is steady de alignment, rather than cyclical realignment. Parties play a crucial role in parliamentary politics, and its purported decline—operationalized here and in other works by an electoral volatility index—has been the focus of numerous studies of electoral and legislative behavior.
Scholars have identified two parallel trends in the linkage between parties and voters. First, voters are showing weaker partisan identification with political parties, and there appears to be a widening gap between the policy preferences of voters and the electoral manifestos of parties. Second, improvements in educational attainment and innovations in media technology are strengthening the political capability of both parties and voters, making it unnecessary or undesirable for both groups to be locked into a mass party structure.
These two changes are interconnected, one symptom of which is the increasing centralization of party platforms in favor of the median voter: the availability of advertising tools allows parties to tap a national audience for votes capability change , but is also exacerbating the ideological distance between parties and voters preference drift. These two explanations have different implications for the future of the party—voter linkage. If preference change is the main culprit for electoral instability, we should see an eventual decline in vote volatility once existing parties realign and adapt to the evolving policy preferences of voters, or when new parties emerge to take their place.
If electoral instability is driven by changes in the political capability of voters and parties, however, then the organizational ties between the two groups will continue to fray, and current vote fluctuations can be interpreted as a precursor to permanent partisan dealignment. In this essay we have analyzed the causal weight of these divergent hypotheses.
Our statistical analysis confirms that older parties are progressively losing votes to newer groups, but equally important, that established parties are failing to ensure that their supporters turn out on polling day. Coupled with the fact that trends in electoral volatility—the rate of change in vote fluctuations—have held steady over time, the preponderance of evidence seems to point to long-term dealignment rather than temporary realignment.
While there has been intriguing new research on when parties form, there is less information about what determines their initial success, how their organizational structure changes over time, and what factors explain their lifespan. This requires comprehensive data on the membership rolls, internal by-laws, ideological composition, and electoral strategies of new parties, but also of established parties which are currently dominant but were once young themselves.
Most studies of electoral and party politics begin in the post-war period as we do , but it is difficult to understand the evolution of new parties without knowing how parties which were small at their inception gradually became larger.
This distinction between small and large parties is more than just a matter of votes, since the organizational foundations of electoral success differ between parties of different size. Kirchheimer , for example, argues that only large, nationally competitive political parties should adopt a catch-all structure, since smaller parties espousing relatively extreme or new ideological positions would be better off allying closely with the niche bloc of voters that care passionately about these issues.
Maintaining a mass organization structure becomes problematic only when the ideological diversity within the party expands or the membership balloons to an unmanageable size, but new parties, particularly postmaterial groups, are still relatively small. As such, it is difficult to infer how they will adjust their organizational foundation should they become successful, especially if Inglehart is correct in predicting an expanding voter base with postmaterialist values. Finally, while electoral volatility is an interesting phenomenon in its own right, it is by no means clear whether this should lead to a more fundamental change in party politics.
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On the other hand, instability in the electorate does not necessarily indicate instability in government composition and formation. The entry of new parties may diminish the electoral salience of established parties, but are these new parties increasingly entering government or causing more rapid turnovers in government composition? Party changes occur when the vote distribution between existing parties with similar ideological positions fluctuates, such as when socialist p. This does not change the overall pattern of political competition, however, since the left vs. Party system change, on the other hand, entails a shift in the cleavage structure of politics or in patterns of government formation.
For example, if a dominant centrist party loses votes to both left- and right-wing parties, the ideological basis of political competition becomes more polarized. Alternatively, when a majoritarian party that competes against a coalition of smaller parties splits, creating a new system where two latent coalitions are vying for power, the basis of government formation is altered.
Fine Gael-Labour. In general, party change appears to be more frequent than party system change, leading Peter Mair to argue that electoral volatility is not fundamentally altering the foundation of political competition Mair ; Mair and Mudde One of the implications from the literature on electoral volatility is that the prevalence of new parties should decrease government longevity, p.
The left panel of Figure The right panel depicts the relationship between the proportion of total government parties that are new defined as never having been in government and cabinet stability, and this, too, indicates that government stability is independent of new party entry. While there are other ways to measure government effectiveness—examining policy outputs and macroeconomic performance come to mind—this figure suggests that the doom and gloom surrounding normative evaluations of electoral volatility may be overblown.
Indeed, to the extent that older parties still occupy most cabinet positions, the decline in their relative vote shares may simply signify the desire to shed electoral fat, or organizational capacity that is irrelevant to legislative power. Restated, the question is whether parties are becoming leaner and meaner vs. While the relative stability in government composition speaks to the former, we trust future research to better explicate the causes and effects of changes to the party—voter linkage. Aldrich, J.
Why Parties? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Find this resource:. Alesina, A. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armingeon, K. Comparative political data set — Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. Benoit, K. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: Rout-ledge. Boix, C. Partisan governments, the international economy, and macroeconomic policies in OECD countries, — World Politics , 38— Bowler, S.
Party cohesion, party discipline, and parliaments. Bowler, D.
Farrell, and R. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Budge, I. Cameron, D. Social democracy, corporatism, labor quiescence, and the representation of economic interest in advanced capitalist society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Campbell, A. The American Voter. Caramani, D. The end of silent elections: the birth of electoral competition, — Party Politics , — London: Macmillan Find this resource:.
From platform declarations to policy outcomes: changing party profiles and partisan influence over policy. Dalton and M. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, T. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Clarke, H. The decline of parties in the minds of citizens. Annual Review of Political Science , 1: — Cox, G. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Dalton, R. The decline of party identifications. The consequences of partisan dealignment. Political parties and their publics. Luther and F. Unthinkable democracy: political change in advanced industrial democracies.
De Winter, L. Conclusion: a comparative analysis of the electoral, office and policy success of ethnoregionalist parties. De Winter and H. New York: Routledge. Downs, A.
derivid.route1.com/el-mejor-s-librese-del.php An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Duverger, M. New York: Wi le y. Ezrow, L. Are moderate parties rewarded in multiparty systems? A pooled analysis of Western European elections, — European Journal of Political Research , — Farrell, D. Campaign modernization and the west European party. Political parties as campaign organizations. Gorvin, I. Elections since A Worldwide Reference Compendium. Chicago: St James Press. Grilli, V. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrialized countries. Economic Policy , — Hibbs, D.
Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review , — Hug, S. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Value change in industrial societies. Iversen, T. The logics of electoral politics: spatial, directional, and mobilizational effects. Comparative Political Studies , — Equality, employment, and budgetary restraint: the trilemma of the service economy. World Politics , — Kalyvas, S. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Katz, R.
London: Sage. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party. Party Politics , 5— Kirchheimer, O. The transformation of the western European party systems. LaPalombara and M. Kitschelt, H. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Korpi, W. Strikes, industrial-relations and class conflict in capitalist societies. British Journal of Sociology , — Lange, P. The politics of growth: strategic interaction and economic performance in the advanced industrial democracies, — Journal of Politics , — Laver, M.
Lewis-Beck, M. Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science , 3: — Lijphart, A. Lipset, S. Registering young voters remains a priority for Elections Canada. In each election, community relations officers are assigned to maximize youth access by conducting special registration campaigns in neighbourhoods with high concentrations of students and electoral districts where post-secondary institutions are located.
In the past, Elections Canada communicated with the heads of the main national student associations to discuss how best to facilitate voting by students on election day. For the January election, Elections Canada made sure that returning officers were especially attentive to young people, since the election period coincided with Christmas exams and holidays. Voter registration and polling stations were set up on campuses to make it easier for young people to vote.
Along the same lines, as part of a pilot project in , returning officers opened 71 satellite offices at select campuses, Friendship Centres and YMCAs to provide information, registration and voting services to youth. Its primary mission in was to encourage First Nations people to exercise their right to vote; in and , however, efforts focused primarily on getting information to First Nations electors in order to help them overcome barriers to voting.
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The contract contained three components. Between and , Elections Canada sent some 1. In spring , moreover, Elections Canada began asking civil society groups to promote the online registration service, which has been in existence since The Labour Force Survey conducted by Statistics Canada following the election revealed that, compared to the general population, a higher proportion of youth aged 18—24 viewed the requirement to produce a proof of identity as an obstacle to voting.
In addition to running ads in various media targeting youth radio stations, digital screens on campuses and on buses, etc. In , the online voter registration service, which was available for the first time within the context of a general election, was used by more than 1. In its communication and awareness campaign for the general election, Elections Canada used social media for the first time to provide electors with information about registration and voting. The Internet offers a wealth of information about political parties, their platforms and leaders. Technology should not, however, be regarded as a panacea for increasing youth electoral engagement.
Young people can be overwhelmed by the quantity and haphazard nature of information that is available on the Internet. As for electronic voting, this method of casting ballots continues to pose technical challenges relating to authentication, security and privacy. Elections Canada sees raising awareness among young people before they reach voting age as a promising approach.
Its parliamentary and electoral simulation exercises give young people their first exposure to the political process and initiate them into the basic aspects of parliamentary debate. In , Elections Canada began supporting the Student Vote Program SVP , which allows young people under the age of 18 to experience the federal electoral process through a parallel election at their school.
Such parallel elections were again held under the SVP in , , and In collaboration with federal and provincial partners, Elections Canada has developed a strategy to create civic education materials on elections for use by Canadian educators. There is little data in Canada about the amount of civics instruction in provincial school curricula. Despite the lack of systematic evaluation of the impact of civic education on youth voter turnout in Canada, the research suggests that civic education does have a positive effect on future voter turnout.
The decline in turnout among those eligible to vote for the first or second time was first observed following the federal general election. Although the number of first- and second-time voters who exercised their right to vote increased substantially in the last two general elections, youth voter turnout remains lower than the turnout for all other age groups. Several studies of youth voter disengagement seem to indicate that the propensity to vote no longer increases with age, as was seemingly the case for previous generations.
The findings of more recent studies are not quite so alarmist, suggesting instead a delay in voter turnout among young people today resulting from their late transition to adult life compared with earlier generations. Other researchers believe that the disengagement may be temporary and may not continue. In the available literature on the determinants of youth voter participation in Canada, there is no consensus regarding the socio-demographic factors that may be at play.
Some researchers suggest that present generations are less interested in politics than previous generations were, while others believe that interest varies from one youth sub-group to another, arguing that youth voters should not be viewed as a homogeneous whole. That being said, several authors seem to agree that Canadian-born youth are much more likely to vote than youth born outside Canada. There also seems to be agreement that the youth voters of today are less knowledgeable when it comes to politics, are more distrustful of the system and have a less-developed sense of civic duty than the generations that came before them.
Trends and Issues , Publication no. They feature historical background, current information and references, and many anticipate the emergence of the issues they examine. Youth Voter Turnout in Canada. Legal and Social Affairs Division Publication No.